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IV

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 20080946-CA

vs.
JESSE VALDEZ,
Defendant/Appe llee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
The State appeals the trial court's dismissal of two criminal charges: possession of
a controlled substance in a drug-free zone and possession of drug paraphernalia in a drugfree zone. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (2008).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Issue:

Whether the trial court correctly concluded that Officer Robertson's

hearsay statement was unreliable under Rule 1102(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Evidence
because the officer did not sufficiently identify that the details of the search came from a
fellow officer.
Standard of Review: Whether statements are "reliable" under the Utah Rules of
Evidence is a factual issue, which is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. See,
State v. Alfred, 2002 UT App 291, t 10, 55 P.3d 1158, 1161; and State v. Parker, 2000
UT5l,1fl3,4P.3d778,78l.

2.

Issue: Whether the trial court correctly declined to bind over the charges based on

insufficient evidence.
Standard of Review.

"[T]he review of a bind over decision is based upon a

correctness standcird ... [however,] the reviewing court should give some deference to a
magistrate's factual findings." State v. Redd, 954 P.2d 230, 233-34 (Utah Ct. App.
1998), rev'd on other grounds, State v. Redd, 1999 UT 108, 992 P.2d 986, (citing State v.
Wodskow, 896 P.2d 29, 31 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)); and State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29,1f 34,
137P.3d787, 795.
CONTROLLING CONSITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
All necessary constitutional and statutory provisions, as well as rules, are included in the
Addenda.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In July, 2008, Jesse Valdez was charged by Information with: (1) Possession or
Use of a Controlled Substance, a third-degree felony, under Utah Code § 58-378(2)(a)(i); and (2) Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, under Utah
Code § 58-37a-5(l). (R. 2). Subsequently, the State amended the charges and alleged
them to have taken place within a drug-free zone, which enhanced them by one degree.
(R. 18).
After hearing testimony during a Preliminary Hearing held on August 28, 2008,
the Honorable James R. Taylor determined that the State failed to meet its burden of
proof and did not bind over the charges. (R. 40: 16-17). The State filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of Denial of Bindover or Request for Permission to Refile Charges on

2

September 9, 2008. (R. 27-20). On October 8, 2008, after consideration of the State's
motion, the Honorable James R. Taylor reaffirmed that the testimony presented was not
"'reliable hearsay' and ... was insufficient to meet the burden of proof required at a
preliminary hearing." (R. 31).
The State filed its Notice of Appeal on November 10, 2008. (R. 38).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Valdez was on supervised probation under the care of Agent Kirt Robinson of
Adult Probation and Parole. (R. 40: 3). On July 12, 2008, at approximately 1 o'clock in
the morning, Agent Robinson, assisted by Officers Barker and Wolcott, conducted a field
visit to Defendant's home. (R. 40: 3). Robinson testified that he conducted the field visit
based on information that Defendant sold methamphetamine passed from "various
people" to local law enforcement agencies, which was subsequently passed to Robinson.
(R. 40: 3-4).
When the officers arrived to Defendant's residence - which was a shed located
adjacent to his mother's mobile home - Robinson knocked on the door and Defendant
answered. (R. 40: 4-5). Robinson asked if he could come in and Defendant consented.
(R. 40: 5). Defendant was the only person in the home. (R. 40: 5).
Once inside, Robinson informed Defendant of the allegation that he was selling
methamphetamine and asked if there was any in the home or on his person. (R. 40: 5).
Defendant denied selling methamphetamine. (R. 40: 5). Robinson searched Defendant
and found nothing, then he searched the couch and found nothing. (R. 40: 5). Robinson
then sat Defendant down on the couch and continued his search. (R. 40: 5).

Because Robinson believed the residence to be "extremely cluttered," he requested
a canine officer to come and do a sweep of the area. (R. 40: 6). Deputy Nielsen of the
Utah County Sheriffs Office arrived with his canine.

(R. 40: 6).

Because of the

cramped space, Deputy Nielsen asked Robinson to remove Defendant. (R. 40: 7). Both
Robinson and Defendant waited outside of the residence as the canine performed its
sweep. (R. 40: 7).
The canine made an initial indication around the bed. (R. 40: 7). Nothing was
found. (R. 40: 7). Deputy Nielsen and Officer Barker told Robinson that during a second
sweep, after the canine indicated in the same area, the indication was "towards the ceiling
of the shed."

(R. 40: 7).

Robinson was not present, but remained outside with

Defendant. (R. 40: 7).
Subsequently, Robinson testified that Officers Barker and Wolcott searched the
top of the shed, which was covered in a tarp. (R. 40: 8). Robinson then stated that
Wolcott reached through a slit in the tarp and retrieved a syringe, a small baggie with
crystalline residue in it, and digital scales. (R. 40: 8). And also, next to the bed was a
carburetor. (R. 40: 8). Robinson testified that the carburetor was taken apart and inside
was a baggie that contained a baggie that contained crystalline substance in it. (R. 40: 8).
Robinson testified that both substances field tested positive for methamphetamine. (R.
40: 9).
On cross-examination and re-direct, Robinson testified that he remained outside
during these searches and did not personally observe them. (R. 40: 10, 14). Furthermore,
defense counsel clarified that when Robinson testified about the tarp and carburetor
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search he did not personally observe the searches, nor was he involved in removing the
items from the location. (R. 40: 12). Also, Robinson did not perform the field tests, but
observed Officer Barker perform them. (R. 40: 13).
On re-direct, the State's attorney asked:
MS. THOMAS - FISHBURN: Did you observe the search yourself- - were you
able to see it from where your were standing with Mr. Valdez?
MR. ROBINSON: Urn - - the third - - where the - MS. THOMAS - FISHBURN: The search with - MR. ROBINSON: - the items were actually found?
MS. THOMAS -FISHBURN: Right.
MR. ROBINSON: No. I was not. I did not observe it.
MS. THOMAS-FISHBURN: Okay. The officers told you what they found.
MR. ROBINSON: Yes.
(R.40: 14).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
..A statement from a non-testifying officer to a testifying officer is reliable, but only
so long as the statement originates among officers. And, to establish that the statement
was passed between officers, there must be clear testimony from the testifying officer that
the statement/information he is relaying originated from another officer. Here, the trial
court correctly concluded that Agent Robinson's testimony was "unreliable" because the
source of the information was never established. Therefore, because Agent Robinson's
testimony was unreliable - in that that trial court did not find that the information came

from another officer - the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that the hearsay
testimony did not conform with Rule 1102(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Furthermore, the State failed to raise other Rule 1102 exceptions to hearsay that
the trial court could have ruled on. Thus, these matters should not be addressed on
Appeal. If, however, this Court concludes that other 1102 exceptions were properly
raised, Defendant argues that they are not dispositive because they either do not apply or
their unreliability is fatal.
Additionally, because Agent Robinson's statements were "unreliable" hearsay, no
independent bases of facts were presented at the preliminary hearing to satisfy the
probable cause requirement. Without the hearsay, Agent Robinson's personal-knowledge
statements only establish that he arrived at Defendant's home and that he remained
outside with Defendant.

Again, without the hearsay, Robinson cannot testify that a

search was conducted which revealed contraband. As such, insufficient evidence was
presented at the preliminary hearing for the trial court to conclude that a crime was
committed and that Defendant committed it.
Moreover, whether the trial court permitted the State to continue the hearing under
1102(c) is a discretionary matter. The trial court acted appropriately, and within its
authority, by not granting the State a continuance. And, by doing so is not evidence of
the trial court's unreasonableness.
Finally, defense counsel properly objected to the sufficiency of evidence at the
preliminary hearing.

Although defense counsel did not make a contemporaneous

objection to the hearsay, it was clearly presented before the court and before final
6

judgment. Thus, the trial court was allowed to consider whether or not to take Agent
Robinson's hearsay testimony into account. Therefore, the trial court acted appropriately
by considering defense counsel's argument.
ARGUMENT
I.

I he I n a i Court Correctly Concluded that the Agent's Testimony was
"Unreliable" Hearsay under Rule 1102 of the Utah Rules of Evidence
Hearsay presented at a preliminary hearing is not presumptively admissible; rather

it becomes admissible only by offering some quantum of reliability. See, Utah R. Evid.
1102(b) (1999); State v. Rhinehart 2006 UT App 517, ^ 15 n. 5, 153 P.3d 830 (hearsay
evidence is admissible at the preliminary hearing as long as that evidence is reliable). At
the preliminary hearing, the State failed to present evidence that Agent Robinson's
testimony qualified as an exception to the hearsay rule under Rule 1102 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence. Therefore, the trial court correctly concluded that the testimony was "not
reliable hearsay." (R. 31).
The State claims that this Court should review this hearsay issue "for correctness,
without deference to the lower court's interpretation" because it involves the
interpretation of evidentiary Rule 1102 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. (Appellant Br. at
2).

In State v. Rhinehart, 2005 UT App 517, this Court addressed whether the

defendant's motion to quash the bindover should have been granted due to the improper
admission of hearsay evidence at the preliminary hearing. There, this Court applied the
following standard of review:

[W]hen a case presents only a question of law, namely whether hearsay
used at the preliminary hearing was admissible under Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), or
reliable under rule 1102 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, this court will
review the bindover determination for correctness giving no deference to
the trial court. See State v. Graham, 2006 UT 43, ^ 16 n. 7, 143 P.3d 268.
Rhinehart 2006 UT App 517,18.
In issuing this standard of reviewr as it relates to rule 1102, this court in Rhinehart
cited the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Graham. However, Graham does not address
rule 1102, nor the issue of reliable hearsay. Valdez therefore asserts that the standard set
forth by the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, 122 P.3d 639, is the
more appropriate framework for review here:
Our standard of review on the admissibility of hearsay evidence is complex,
since the determination of admissibility "often contains a number of
rulings, each of which may require a different standard of review."
Norman H. Jackson, Utah Standards of Appellate Review, 12 Utah Bar J. 8,
38 (1999). We review the legal questions to make the determination of
admissibility for correctness. Hansen v. Hansen, 852 P.2d 977, 979 (Utah
1993). We review the questions of fact for clear error. State v. Parker,
2000 UT 51, Par 13, 4 P.3d 778. Finally, we review the district court's
ruling on admissibility for abuse of discretion. Eggett v. Wasatch Energy
Corp., 2004 UT 28, Par 10, 94 P.3d 193.
Workman, 2005 UT 66, at \ 10.
Valdez does not contest that "a statement of a non-testifying peace officer to a
testifying peace officer" qualifies as reliable hearsay under rule 1102. Moreover, that
issue is not what is at issue in this case. What is at issue in this case is purely a question
of fact: Whether the information contained in the hearsay testimony of an officer came
from a non-testifying officer. Because this issue involves purely a question of fact, it
should be reviewed for clear error.
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a. The State Failed to Present Evidence that the Hearsay Statements
Came from a Fellow Peace Officer Under 1102(b)(6)
"Out-of-court declarations offered for the truth of the matter asserted are
nadmissible as hearsay unless they fit within one of the established exceptions to the
learsay rule." State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah 1995). Rule 1102 of the Utah
lules of Evidence delineate particular exceptions to the hearsay rule - particularly, Rule
[102(b)(6), which states that "a statement from a non-testifying peace officer to a
estifying peace officer" is reliable, and therefore, admissible hearsay. Utah R. Evid.
[102(b)(6) (1999). Reliability, however, is the touchstone for admissible hearsay.
"Exceptions to the hearsay rule are based on factors that provide assurances of
estimonial reliability sufficient to dispense with the usual means of purging testimony of
OTor and falsehood ...." State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah 1995). Apparently, the
Jtah legislature has determined, via Rule 1102 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, that for
mrposes of a preliminary hearing reliable hearsay is admissible. See, Utah R. Evid. 1102
1999); Utah Const, art. 1, § 12; accord, State v. Rhinehart 2006 UT App 517,ffif12-15,
[53 P.3d 830. Hearsay proffered at a preliminary hearing is not presumptively reliable or
idmissible, however.
To be admissible, the proffered hearsay must be reliable. Rule 1102 delineates
;everal hearsay exceptions and deems them reliable for the purposes of a preliminary
rearing.

For an out-of-court statement, offered for the truth of the matter, to be

admissible under Rule 1102(b)(6), the statement must be from a non-testifying officer to
the testifying officer. Utah R. Evid. 1102(b)(6) (1999). Thus, unless it is clear to the

magistrate that the statement being made by the testifying officer originated from another
officer, Rule 1102(b)(6) is inapplicable.
Presently, the crux of the peace officer's (Agent Robinson) testimony illustrates
the lack of reliability because he never identifies whether the source of his hearsay
statements at issue here came from a fellow officer, nor does he testify with sufficient
specificity that the drugs were found in the carburetor. Agent Robinson's testimony is as
follows:
STATE'S COUNSEL: As a result of that secondary search by the canine, what
did you then do?
MR. ROBINSON: Um - another - another search was conducted in that area.
Officer Barker and Officer Wolcott - um - searched - um - basically the top of
the shed is covered in a tarp and all kinds of hanging material and small objects.
Um - there was a slit visible in the tarp. Um - Officer Wolcott reached up
through the slit and retrieved a syringe, a small baggie with crystalline residue in
it, and digital scales. Um - there - there was also an engine part, a carburetor
actually laying right next to the bed. Um - the carburetor was taken apart, and
inside, a piece of the carburetor was another baggie, a pink, reddish colored
baggie. Um - it also had a crystalline substance in it.
(R. 40: 8). Although Agent Robinson refers to Officers Wolcott and Barker and the
search and discovery of paraphernalia, there is nothing indicating how and from whom
Agent Robinson learned about the search of the carburetor and discovery of the baggie
containing the crystalline substance. See, R. 40: 10-11. Thus, Agent Robinson learned
10

this information second hand, and for that information to be admitted under Rule
1102(b)(6), it must be clear that it came from another officer. Agent Robinson was never
clear about who told him about the carburetor search. Agent Robinson testified as to the
other officers' search of the tarp on top of the shed; however, his hearsay testimony
concerning the carburetor is not linked to
Moreover, the State's re-direct of Agent Robinson on this matter never clarified
who told whom about what. On re-direct, Agent Robinson admitted to not being present
or observing the search. (R. 40: 14). He did, however acknowledge that "[t]he officers
told [him] what they found." (R. 40:14). But, Agent Robinson did not specifically
acknowledge what it was that the officers found.

In conjunction with the previous

testimony, the only specificity regarding the search was that the officers found a syringe,
a small baggie and digital scales. Agent Robinson never clearly stated that the officers
told him that they found a baggie after searching the carburetor. Thus, as the trial court
observed, the "evidence was a step removed from hearsay and that the Court was asked to
simply assume from the circumstances that some officer found the substance in a location
that connected it to the Defendant." (R. 32).
Specifically, in its ruling, the trial court predicated this factual finding on the
following:

Officer Robertson [sic] testified that "officer," told him that Officer Watcott
reached into a slit in an overhead tarp above the bed and retrieved a syringe
and a baggie with a very slight bit of what appeared to be drug residue. He
also understood that someone identified and disassembled an automobile
carburetor next to the bed and found a baggie with a larger amount of
crystal substance. The Court has re-listed to the testimony and cannot
determine that Officer Robertson [sic] identified who told him that the
carburetor had been searched or who did the searching of the carburetor.
Officer Robertson [sic] testified quite specifically that he did not observe
either physical search following the K-9 sweeps and had no personal
knowledge about who located what or where the items were located.
(R. 33). While Agent Robinson acknowledged that the "officers" told him what they
found, the trial court found this too vague of a statement to be reliable under Rule
1102(b)(6). In this acknowledgment, Agent Robinson does not identify which officer
told him what, nor does he indicate which officer searched the carburetor and found the
baggie. As such, the trial court refused to assume that Agent Robinson's statements came
from another agent.
Moreover, Agent Robinson admitted to not being present, but relates the events of
that day as if he personally witnessed them - particularly the carburetor search. To
rectify this inconsistency, the State calls on this Court to make an assumption - that one
of the officers that conducted the search told Agent Robinson about what occurred.
However, it is not the court's job to assume that technicalities of hearsay exceptions are
satisfied.

At the preliminary hearing the State failed to elicit from Agent Robinson

exactly who told him what. This matter could have been easily rectified by posing the
question: "Agent Robinson, because you were not present during the searches, how did
you learn of this information?" Consequently, the State failed to clarify the matter and
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the trial court was left without a nexus between Agent Robinson's testimony and another
officer.
Also, the trial court acted within its discretion by concluding Agent Robinson's
testimony was a uvague, unspecific presentation [and] not 'reliable hearsay.'" (R. 31).
During cross-examination of Agent Robinson at the preliminary hearing, the State's
attorney asked, and Agent Robinson confirmed, that he was not present, nor did he
observe the searches.

(R. 40: 14). Subsequently, the State's attorney stated, "[t]he

officers told you what they found." And Agent Robinson replied, "Yes." (R. 40:14).
Although its possible that the trial court could have inferred that "the officers" referred to
Officers Barker, Wolcott or Deputy Nielsen, as a factual matter, the trial court found this
insufficient.
In a written ruling, the trial court reaffirmed that the Agent's testimony was
unreliable. In the ruling, the trial court stated:
In this case the State asked the Court to rely not on a specific declaration of
a non-testifying officer but upon the assumption of Officer Robertson [sic]
that information he had obtained came from one of the several officers who
were there and found what was then field tested. This vague, unspecific
presentation was not "reliable hearsay" and, without those inferences the
testimony presented by the State was insufficient to meet the burden of
proof required at a preliminary hearing.
(R. 31).

Valdez sides with the trial court that because Agent Robinson did not

particularly identify which of the officers actually conveyed that information, the court
was left to make an assumption. And, because the trial court was unwilling to make this
assumption, insufficient indicia of reliability existed to conclude the testimony satisfied
Rule 1102 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

Conversely, the State contends that the trial court "did not correctly interpret or
apply" Rule 1102(b)(6)'s "presumption of reliability and admissibility." (Appellant Br.
at 12-14). The State bases this argument on the "fellow officer" rule, otherwise known as
the "collective knowledge" doctrine. (Appellant Br. at 12). Although true, the State's
application of this rule is misapplied.
The State cites United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d
684 (1965), for the proposition that a finding of probable cause is "a practical, not
abstract or technical, interpretation of facts" under the "fellow officer" rule. (Appellant
Br. at 13). Although in Ventresca the Court states that a finding of probable cause, "like
all constitutional requirements, are practical and not abstract[,]" the Court certainly did
not disregard the importance of being technical when complying with the rules. U.S. v.
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108 (1965).
The technical aspect that must be satisfied for the "fellow officer" rule to apply, is
that there must be a "substantial basis for crediting the hearsay." Ventresca, 380 U.S. at
108. The State farther cites Ventresca for the principle that:
Hearsay information . . . need not reflect the direct personal observations of
the officer swearing to the information so long as the magistrate is informed
of some of the underlying circumstances supporting the officer's
conclusions and his belief that any person involved in providing the
information whose identity need not be disclosed was credible or his
information reliable.
(Appellant Br. at 13) (quoting Ventresca, 380 U.S. at 107-08). According to the State, an
officer's statements are presumptively reliable because there is an assumption that
officers communicate to each other truthfully.
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(Appellant Br. at 14); See, State v.

Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 1986). And as such, an officer's hearsay statements
from another officer, offered at a preliminary hearing, are reliable. Valdez agrees with
this proposition because it supports the underlying technicality - that the out-of-court
statement came from another peace officer.
Essentially, the State's argument on this point only substantiates the legislature's
reasoning for allowing officers to give hearsay testimony. What the State's argument
does not do is justify that merely because a hearsay statement is made by a testifying
officer it should be presumptively reliable. As Rule 1102(b)(6) clearly points out, it is
not just that the testifying person is a peace officer, but that the out-of-court statements he
is repeating in court came from another officer. Here, Agent Robinson's testimony never
identified the source of his information and thus the trial court "was asked to simply
assume from the circumstances that some officer found the substance in a location that
connected it to the Defendant." (R. 32) (emphasis in original). The State failed to bridge
the gap between the events Agent Robinson testified to and who told him about the
events.
Therefore, because Agent Robinson did not identify who told him about the
search, Rule 1102(b)(6) is inapplicable and the trial court ruled correctly.
b. Rule 1102(b)(3) is Inapplicable Because the Hearsay was Not Proffered
to Establish the Foundation or the Authenticity of an Exhibit
First, the State has failed to preserve a Rule 1102(b)(3) issue for appeal and thus it
should not be considered. The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that:

In order to preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be presented to the
trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on
that issue. This requirement puts the trial judge on notice of the asserted
error and allows for correction at that time in the course of the proceeding.
For a trial court to be afforded an opportunity to correct the error (1) the
issue must be raised in a timely fashion, (2) the issue must be specifically
raised, and (3) the challenging party must introduce supporting evidence or
relevant legal authority.
438 Main Street v. Easy Heat. Inc.. 2004 UT 72, % 51, 99 P.3d 801. Here, the record is
devoid of anything regarding Rule 1102(b)(3) that the trial court ruled on. Therefore, this
Court should not consider the State's argument. If this Court finds, however, that the
issue was properly raised, Valdez asserts that Rule 1102(b)(3) is inapplicable.
While Rule 1102(b)(3) indicates that hearsay is reliable for the purpose of
establishing foundation for or the authenticity of any exhibit, this rule is inapplicable
here. Utah R. Evid. 1102(b)(3) (1999). Under these facts Rule 1102(b)(3) is clearly
inapplicable because Agent Robinson's testimony was not given for the purpose of
foundation or authenticity of an exhibit. The State's argument supports that conclusion.
(Appellate Br. at 17) ("As it happened, no foundation was needed in this preliminary
hearing because the baggie was not introduced into evidence.").
Additionally, the State misapplies the purpose behind the rule.

As Rule

1102(b)(3) clearly states, such hearsay is reliable and therefore admissible at a
preliminary hearing for the purpose of creating foundation or authenticating an exhibit.
Utah R. Evid. 1102(b)(3) (1999). As the Advisory Committee Notes indicate, such
hearsay is admissible only as to exhibits; "[f]or example, proving the chain of custody for
controlled substances may be accomplished under this section without calling the
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witnesses in the chain." Utah R. Evid. 1102(b)(3) (1999) Advisory Committee Notes.
No such circumstance exists here. Therefore, Rule 1102(b)(3) does not apply.
c. 1102(b)(1) Present Sense Impression does Permit the Introduction of
Facts Because the Perceiving Party is Unidentified
First, the State has failed to preserve a Rule 1102(b)(1) issue for appeal and thus it
should not be considered. The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that:
In order to preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be presented to the
trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on
that issue. This requirement puts the trial judge on notice of the asserted
error and allows for correction at that time in the course of the proceeding.
For a trial court to be afforded an opportunity to correct the error (1) the
issue must be raised in a timely fashion, (2) the issue must be specifically
raised, and (3) the challenging party must introduce supporting evidence or
relevant legal authority.
438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ^ 51, 99 P.3d 801. Here, the record is
devoid of anything regarding Rule 1102(b)(1) that the trial court considered. Therefore,
this Court should not consider the State's argument. If this Court finds, however, that the
issue was properly raised, Valdez asserts that Rule 1102(b)(1) is inapplicable.
As the State correctly points out, Rule 1102(b)(1) deems hearsay reliable for the
purposes of a preliminary hearing if it would be admissible under the Utah Rules of
Evidence. (Appellate Br. at 18); Utah R. Evid. 1102(b)(1) (1999). According to the
State, Agent Robinson's testimony is reliable hearsay under Rule 803(1) Present Sense
Impression. Id. Present Sense Impression, however, would not permit the introduction
of hearsay evidence that Agent Robinson did not personally perceive.
A present sense impression is "[a] statement describing or explaining an event or
condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately
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thereafter." Utah R. Evid. 803(1) (2004). Here, there are two conditions of the Rule
803(1) present sense impression that are fatal to its applicability.
First, Rule 803(1) requires that the declarant had made the statement either while
perceiving the event or immediately thereafter. Utah R. Evid. 803(1) (2004). Nothing in
the record indicates that the perceiving officer's statement was made while perceiving the
event or immediately thereafter. As explained in the Advisory Committee Notes of the
Federal Rules1, "[t]he underlying theory of Exception [for presence sense impression] is
that substantial contemporaneity of event and statement negate the likelihood of
deliberate or conscious misrepresentation."

Fed. R. Evid. 803; see also, State v.

Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 700 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (finding that because the statements
were made while the declarant perceived the events, the statement was admissible);
United States v. Manfre, 368 F.3d 832, 840 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding that too much time
had elapsed between the event and the statements); State v. Tucker, 68 P.3d 110, 118-19
(Ariz. 2003) (recognizing that u[t]he more time that elapses between the event and the
statement, the stronger the possibility that a declarant will attempt, either consciously or
subconsciously, to alter his or her description of the event."). There is nothing in the
record as to how much time had elapsed between the event, as perceived by the officers,
and the statement to Agent Robinson.

As such, a proper inquiry into the matter is

impossible and therefore Rule 803(1) is inapplicable.

1

Rule 803 of the Utah Rules of Evidence uis the federal rule verbatim." Utah R. Evid.
803, Advisory Committee Note.
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Second, Agent Robinson never indicated who made the present sense impression
statements that he repeated at the preliminary hearing.

One of the elements of a

statement being admitted as a present sense impression is that "the declarant must have
personally perceived the event described...." United States v. Mitchell 145 F.3d 572,
576 (3rd Cir. 1998). In Mitchell, the Court of Appeals rejected the admissibility of outof-court statements describing an event where the declarant was anonymous. Mitchell
involved officers investigating the robbery of a armored truck and the admissibility of an
anonymous note regarding information about the get-away cars. Mitchell, 145 F.3d at
574-75.
Reflecting on an earlier decision, the Third Circuit reiterated that "'a party seeking
to introduce an anonymous statement carries a burden heavier than where the declarant is
identified to demonstrate the statement's circumstantial trustworthiness.'" Mitchell 145
F.3d at 576 (citing Miller v. Keating, 754 F.2d 507, 510 (3rd Cir. 1985)). This went to
the heart of whether the declarant personally perceived the event. And because the
record was "devoid of circumstances indicating by preponderance that the author of the
anonymous note actually saw Mitchell change cars" the Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court and held that the present sense impression hearsay exception was not satisfied.
Mitchell, 145F.3dat577.
Similarly here, the State presented no evidence as to who made the statements
Agent Robinson repeated in court that would satisfy the requirement that "the declarant
must have personally perceived the event described." Mitchell, 145 F.3d at 576. This is
precisely what the trial court reasoned:

In this case [ ] Officer Robertson didn't specifically recite any statements of
a non-testifying officer about the larger baggie found in the carburetor.
While the testimony was specific about Officer Watcott reaching into the
tear in the overhead tarp, the smaller baggie and syringe, by themselves,
contain insufficient quantities to establish the felony charge. Officer
Robertson was unable to stat who searched the carburetor or who found the
larger baggie of suspected drugs. The view of the Court at the time of the
preliminary hearing, and now, is that this evidence was a step removed
from hearsay and that the Court was asked to simply assume from the
circumstances that some officer found the substance in a location that
connected it to the Defendant.
(R. 32) (emphasis in original). Agent Robinson never indicated who made the statements
that he repeated in court; thus, making the original statements anonymous. See, U.S v.
Mitchell, 145 F.3d 572 (3rd Cir. 1998).
Therefore, because Agent Robinson did not sufficiently identify which officer, if
any, made the statements he repeated in court, the source is anonymous and the thus
unreliable hearsay under Rule 1102(b)(2).
d. There was Insufficient Indicia of Reliability for the Trial Court to have
Determined the Agent's Hearsay Statements Complied with Rule
1102(b)(9)
First, the State has failed to preserve a Rule 1102(b)(9) issue for appeal and thus it
should not be considered. The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that:
In order to preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be presented to the
trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on
that issue. This requirement puts the trial judge on notice of the asserted
error and allows for correction at that time in the course of the proceeding.
For a trial court to be afforded an opportunity to correct the error (1) the
issue must be raised in a timely fashion, (2) the issue must be specifically
raised, and (3) the challenging party must introduce supporting evidence or
relevant legal authority.
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438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, U 51, 99 P.3d 801. Here, the record is
devoid of anything regarding Rule 1102(b)(9) that the trial court ruled on. Therefore, this
Court should not consider the State's argument. If this Court finds, however, that the
issue was properly raised, Valdez asserts that Rule 1102(b)(9) is inapplicable.
The State claims that "even if the hearsay statements] were 'one step removed'
from this traditional hearsay exception, subsection (b)(9) of rule 1102 would still deem
the statement admissible at preliminary hearing if it had 'similar indicia of reliability.'"
(Appellant Br. at 18); Utah R. Evid 1102(b)(9) (1999) ("other hearsay evidence with
similar indicia of reliability"). The State's conclusion that "indicia of reliability exist
given the testifying agent's own observations of the large baggie after the officers
emerged from the shed and the agent's personal knowledge that the carburetor was next
to the Defendant's bed[]" omits a necessary nexus. (Appellant Br. at 18).
Although he testified from personal knowledge that a carburetor was located in
Valdez's shed, Agent Robinson never conducted nor even witnessed the alleged search of
the carburetor (R. 40: 13-14). Thus, for the trial court to bridge that nexus between
Agent Robinson's knowledge of the existence of the carburetor and the contraband, it
would have to rely on the hearsay testimony regarding the search. However, as the trial
court concluded, Agent Robinson never revealed who told him what about the search.
(R. 31). Therefore, because the source of the information is in question, there is no
indicia of reliability that the trial court determined that it could rely on to make the
connection the State calls for.
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In sum, because the trial court correctly concluded that Agent Robinson's
testimony lacked reliability (R. 31), there is no indication that the court was clearly
erroneous in its factual determination. See, State v. Allred, 2002 UT App 291, ^ 10; and
State v. Parker, 2000 UT 51,1 13.
II.

The Trial Court Acted Appropriately in Concluding that the State Failed
to Present Sufficient Evidence for Bindover
The purpose of a preliminary hearing is for the magistrate to determine whether

"the crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it[.]" Utah
R. Crim. P. 7(i)(2) (2005). The Utah Supreme Court has clearly stated that the probable
cause standard for a preliminary hearing "is the same as the probable cause that the
prosecution must show to obtain an arrest warrant[.]" State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ^f 18.
As such, the "prosecution must present sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief
... while still allowing magistrates to fulfill the primary purpose of the preliminary
hearing, ferreting out groundless and improvident prosecutions." State v. Virgin, 2006
UT 29, f 18 (internal citation and quotations omitted).
Here, the State erroneously contends that even without Agent Robinson's hearsay
testimony, sufficient evidence existed to establish probable cause for bindover.
(Appellant Br. 20). Without Agent Robinson's hearsay statements, the only possible way
for the trial court to have found probable cause was based on Robinson's personal
knowledge. Agent Robinson's personal testimony, however, was seriously deficient and
does not rise to the level of probable cause.
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The only personal-knowledge testimony elicited from Robinson regarding the
contraband was that he was present when a field test was conducted. (R. 40: 12). Agent
Robinson never testified that he personally observed the search that revealed the
contraband.

Omitting the remaining hearsay testimony - that officers searched the

carburetor and discovered a baggie with some crystalline substance - demonstrates that
Agent Robinson's personal-knowledge testimony alone only proves that contraband was
found and not that it was found in Valdez's shed or in his possession. (R. 40: 8). In
order for the trial court to conclude that the contraband was discovered inside the
carburetor is to rely on the hearsay.
Furthermore, without the hearsay statements, the trial court could not make any
reasonable inferences that a crime was committed and that Defendant committed it. See,
Utah R. Crim. P. 7(i)(2) (2005). The State contends that "the magistrate 'may only
disregard or discredit evidence that is wholly lacking and incapable of creating a
reasonable inference regarding a portion of the prosecution's claim.'" (Appellate Br. at
19) (quoting State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, ^ 24) (internal quotations omitted). Although
true, in order for the magistrate to even consider the statements, they must be accepted as
evidence.

See, State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 778 (Utah 1981) (holding that a

defendant is "entitled to a determination by the court of the evidence's constitutional
admissibility; and once admissible, it may be presented to the fact-finder). Because the
trial court found the statements from Agent Robinson to be unreliable hearsay (R. 31) and
therefore inadmissible, there can be no inferences from which the trial court could have
inferred "in the prosecution's favor." (Appellant Br. at 19).

While Agent Robinson's personal-knowledge testimony may have established that
a crime was committed - the positive field test for contraband that he witnessed - without
the hearsay statements, nothing ties the contraband to Valdez. See, State v. Virgin, 2006
UT 29, ^f 18. Therefore, the trial court acted appropriately by not granting the bindover.
a. Regardless of Hearsay Objections, Continuances under Rule 1102(c)(1)
are Permissive, and Not Granted as a Matter of Right
Subsection (c) of Rule 1102 states that: "If hearsay evidence is proffered or
admitted in the preliminary examination, a continuance of the hearing may be granted for
the purpose of furnishing additional evidence if: (1) The magistrate finds that the hearsay
evidence proffered or admitted is not sufficient and additional evidence is necessary for a
bindover[.]" Utah R. Evid. 1102 (c) (1999) (emphasis added). The State argues that trial
court's refusal to grant a continuance so that other officers could be called to testify was
"unreasonable, given the lack of a timely objection to the admission of the hearsayf]" and
despite no prior continuances had been granted. (Appellant Br. at 20-21). The trial
court's decision not to permit the State's continuance, however, was not unreasonable.
The Utah Supreme Court stated that "[i]t is well established in Utah, as elsewhere,
that the granting of a continuance is at the discretion of the trial judge, whose decision
will not be reversed by this Court absent a clear abuse of that discretion." State v.
Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982). At the conclusion of the preliminary hearing,
after the State had moved for a continuance to call additional testimony, the trial court
held:
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I'm not going to move the prelim. That was a bad choice, counsel. You
know, probable cause can be established on hearsay ... [b]ut this one - all
I've got is the officer's received report from someone who said that
someone was buying from the defendant. He went to the location, didn't
find anything himself. He stepped outside, and then I have a report that an
officer found some drugs. I don't have any direct testimony that the drugs
were located. Um - this one falls short.
(R. 40: 16-17). The trial court determined that counsel for the State made a poor tactical
decision and, implicitly, ruled against a continuance because it would not be judicially
efficient to permit a continuance under these circumstances. Therefore, the trial court did
not clearly abuse his discretion under Rule 1102(c)(1) by denying a continuance.
b. Untimeliness Does Not Affect the Trial Court's Responsibility of
Determining Reliability of the Hearsay Testimony
The State cites Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 682 P.2d 832 (Utah 1984), for the
proposition that because defense counsel did not make a hearsay objection at the time of
Agent Robinson's testimony, that it was untimely and the trial court should not have
entertained the objection post-testimony. (Appellant Br. at 21). Whether defense counsel
made the objection contemporaneous to the hearsay testimony or before judgment, the
objection was proper and the trial court appropriately considered it.
In Barson, the Utah Supreme Court held that
Where there was no clear and definite objection on the basis of hearsay,
that theory cannot now be raised on appeal. [Appellant] did raise a hearsay
objection after judgment was entered in the case. However, issues raised for
the first time in post-judgment motions are raised too late to be reviewed on
appeal. Therefore, we are precluded from addressing this assertion of error
on the merits.

is

Barson v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 682 P.2d 832, 837 (Utah 1984). Barson actually supports
Valdez's position that defense counsel made a timely objection for the trial court to
properly consider.
First, Barson indicates that there must be a "clear and definite objection on the
basis of hearsay[.j" Barson, 682 P.2d at 837. Defense counsel's objection was clear and
definite. After Agent Robinson's testimony, defense counsel objected to the testimony as
insufficient to establish probable cause because there was no direct evidence. (R. 40: 1516). Defense counsel's objection was clear enough that the trial court recognized the
insufficiency of evidence was based on hearsay and ruled accordingly. This is in line
with Barson.
Second, Barson holds that for a hearsay objection to be raised on appeal, it cannot
be raised post-judgment. Barson, 682 P.2d at 837. Defense counsel's objection was
made pre-judgment. At the conclusion of testimony, although not contemporaneous with
it, defense counsel made its objection regarding the agent's hearsay. This too complies
with Barson.
Furthermore, the State contends that it was the responsibility of defense counsel or
the magistrate to have "asked Agent Robinson to identify which officer discovered the
large baggie or informed him of its discovery...." (Appellant Br. 21). Contrary to the
State's belief, it is not the responsibility of either defense counsel or the magistrate to
correct the State's evidentiary deficiencies. See, State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 407
(Utah 1989) (holding that "the burden is on the party proffering the evidence to
demonstrate that it has the requisite degree of reliability.").
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the aforementioned reasons, Valdez respectfully requests that this court affirm
the trial court's refusal to bind over based on insufficiency of evidence.

Respectfully submitted this
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Margaret P. Lindsay
Counsel for Appellee,
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State Court Rules
*S Utah Rules of Evidence (Refs & Annos)
*a Article XI. Miscellaneous Rules
.+ RULE 1102. RELIABLE HEARSAY IN CRIMINAL PRELIMINARY EXAMINATIONS

(a) Statement of the Rule.Reliable hearsay is admissible at criminal preliminary examinations.

(b) Definition of Reliable Hearsay.For purposes of criminal preliminary examinations only, reliable hearsay includes:

(1) hearsay evidence admissible at trial under the Utah Rules of Evidence;

(2) hearsay evidence admissible at trial under Rule 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, regardless of the availability of the declarant at the preliminary examination;

(3) evidence establishing the foundation for or the authenticity of any exhibit;

(4) scientific, laboratory, or forensic reports and records;

(5) medical and autopsy reports and records;

(6) a statement of a non-testifying peace officer to a testifying peace officer;
(7) a statement made by a child victim of physical abuse or a sexual offense which is promptly,reported by the
child victim and recorded in accordance with Rule 15.5 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure;
(8) a statement of a declarant that is written, recorded, or transcribed verbatim which is:

(A) under oath or affirmation; or

(B) pursuant to a notification to the declarant that a false statement made therein is punishable.

(9) other hearsay evidence with similar indicia of reliability, regardless of admissibility at trial under Rules

803 and 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

(c) Continuance for Production of Additional Evidence.If hearsay evidence is proffered or admitted in the
preliminary examination, a continuance of the hearing may be granted for the purpose of furnishing additional
evidence if:

(1) The magistrate finds that the hearsay evidence proffered or admitted is not sufficient and additional evidence is necessary for a bindover; or

(2) The defense establishes that it would be so substantially and unfairly disadvantaged by the use of the
hearsay evidence as to outweigh the interests of the declarant and the efficient administration of justice.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT CO
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
State of Utah,
Ruling
Plaintiff

:

vs.

:

Date: October 9,2008

Jesse Valdez,

:

Case Number: 081402004

:

Division VII: Judge James R. Taylor

Defendant

This matter comes before the Court on the State's motion for reconsideration of this
Court's ruling that the State failed to meet its burden of proof at the preliminary hearing held
August 28, 2008.
The State relied upon a single witness at the preliminary hearing. Probation Officer Curt
Robertson testified that he had received "numerous" calls from other law enforcement agencies
complaining that Mr. Valdez was involved in selling narcotics. As the agent assigned to Mr.
Valdez, Mr. Robertson went with several Provo police officers to the shed where Mr. Valdez
lived at 1 a.m. on July 12, 2008. After several knocks Mr. Valdez came to the door and let
Officer Robertson in. Mr. Valdez, himself, was searched and nothing was found. A couch was
searched and nothing was found. Nothing was found during a quick search of the interior of the
shed although the place was extremely cluttered with hundreds of nooks, crannies and
automobile parts in which drugs could be hidden. Officer Robertson requested a canine search.
Deputy Nielson, a K-9 officer for the Utah County Sheriffs Office arrived. Officer Robertson
Page 1 of

5

was asked to take Mr. Valdez outside while the dog searched. Deputy Nielson came out and
reported that the dog alerted on an area near the bed.
Officers other than Officer Robertson searched while Robertson remained outside with
Valdez. Nothing was found. The dog conducted another search and Deputy Nielson reported
that the dog seemed to be interested in something "higher." Provo officers Barker and Watcott
re-entered the shed and searched again. Officer Robertson did not observe the search.
Officer Robertson testified that "officers," told him that Officer Watcott reached into a
slit in an overhead tarp above the bed and retrieved a syringe and a baggie with a very slight bit
of what appeared to be drug residue. He also understood that someone identified and
disassembled an automobile carburetor next to the bed and found a baggie with a larger amount
of crystal substance. The Court has re-listened to the testimony and cannot determine that
Officer Robertson identified who told him that the carburetor had been searched or who did the
searching of the carburetor. Officer Robertson testified quite specifically that he did not observe
either physical search following the K-9 sweeps and had no personal knowledge about who
located what or where the items were located. Both baggies were field tested and a positive
result for methamphetamine was received.
Rule 1102 allows the use of reliable hearsay at criminal preliminary hearings. Reliable
hearsay is defined at 1102(b)(6) as "a statement of a non-testifying peace officer to a testifying
peace officer." In this case, however, Officer Robertson didn't specifically recite any statements

Page 2 of

5

of a non-testifying officer about the larger baggie found in the carburetor. While the testimony
was specific about Officer Watcott reaching into the tear in the overhead tarp, the smaller baggie
and syringe, by themselves, contained insufficient quantities to establish the felony charge.
Officer Robertson was unable to state who searched the carburetor or who found the larger
baggie of suspected drugs. The view of the Court at the time of the preliminary hearing, and
now, is that this evidence was a step removed from hearsay and that the Court was asked to
simply assume from the circumstances that some officer found the substance in a location that
connected it to the Defendant.
It has long been the tradition, in Utah Courts, to protect the basic right to confront
witnesses at a preliminary hearing. In State v. Anderson, 612 P2d 778 at 786 (Utah, 1980) the
Court noted:
. . . the ancillary benefits inherent in this preliminary proceeding,
e.g., the various aspects of discovery incident to the pretrial
examination of prosecution witnesses, would be seriously curtailed
by denying the defendant a right of confrontation at the hearing.
This curtailment would infringe upon the defendant's right to a fair
trial, by denying him the opportunity to prepare an effective defense.
For example, the cross-examination of witnesses at this
preliminary stage in a criminal prosecution provides the defendant
an opportunity to attack their testimony before it becomes
immutable by repetition and the influence, however legitimate, of
the prosecution. Also, favorable testimony will often be elicited
from the cross-examination of the witnesses at the preliminary
examination and contradictory statements made at the hearing may
subsequently become important as tools for attacking the
credibility of the witnesses at the actual trial.
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The specific prohibition from Anderson on the use of hearsay testimony at a preliminary
hearing has been overturned by amendment to the Utah Constitution in 1996 (Article 1, Section
12) and the adoption of Rule 1102, Utah Rules of Evidence in 1995. But the fundamental
purpose of preliminary hearings remains unaltered. In this case the State asked the Court to rely
not on a specific declaration of a non-testifying officer but upon the assumption of Officer
Robertson that information he had obtained came from one of several officers who were there
and found what was then field tested. This vague, unspecific presentation was not "reliable
hearsay" and, without those inferences the testimony presented by the State was insufficient to
meet the burden of proof required at a preliminary hearing.
The Court respectfully declines to modify its previous ruling.
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